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 ̂  15 on the Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS)  [14] . 
Past-PTSD individuals (n = 19) met full PTSD criteria in the past; 
no-PTSD individuals (n = 21) had never met full PTSD criteria. 
Group characteristics are similar to those of epidemiological 
studies  [15] , indicating the representativeness of the sample. Cur-
rent-PTSD individuals scored higher on PDS and Beck’s depres-
sion inventory (BDI)  [16] than past-PTSD and no-PTSD individu-
als, supporting the validity of the group distinction. Current-
PTSD individuals had more co-morbid disorders at the time of 
assessment as compared to past-PTSD and no-PTSD individu-
als  [15] .
 After informed consent, participants started with an IAT  [5] 
measuring spontaneous positive versus negative evaluations of 
present self as compared to prior self. Participants had to classify 
stimuli as quickly as possible into four categories: present self, 
prior self, positive, and negative. Stimuli representing the catego-
ry present self (me-today, me-now, me-afterwards) and the cate-
gory prior self (me-prior, me-then, me-before) were chosen to rep-
resent the self in individuals with PTSD who tend to perceive a 
pervasive change in the view of themselves following trauma. 
Stimulus attributes – positive (good, strong, healthy) and negative 
(bad, weak, diseased) – were derived from the cognitive model of 
PTSD  [2] and evaluated in a pretest to ensure content validity for 
the present IAT. In one task, stimuli representing ‘present-self or 
positive’ had to be classified with one key and stimuli representing 
‘prior-self or negative’ with another key. In the other task, re-
sponse keys of the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ categories were re-
versed. All participants indicated that they understood this task. 
Then, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES)  [17] measured 
present global ESE (  = 0.89). A modified version retrospectively 
measured ESE prior to trauma (  = 0.87). A self-semantic differ-
ential (SD) measured present ESE (  = 0.77) and retrospective ESE 
(  =  0.71). We assessed PDS (  = 0.93), BDI (  = 0.90), and demo-
graphics before debriefing.
 Subjective change in ESE was computed as the difference be-
tween the retrospective and present scale for RSES and SD, re-
spectively. Subjective change in ISE was calculated as the IAT ef-
fect  [18] by subtracting the average response time of all trials of 
the ‘present-self or positive/prior-self or negative’ task from the 
average response time of the ‘prior-self or positive/present-self or 
negative’ task. The difference was divided by the overall individ-
ual standard deviation. Error reaction times were included but no 
error penalties were added, preserving the implicitness of the 
task. Larger positive scores point to a more subjective increase in 
self-esteem, larger negative scores to a subjective decrease. Tests 
were two-tailed (p  ! 0.05). Group differences in subjective change 
in ESE and ISE were tested separately using ANOVAs combined 
with pairwise post-hoc tests. To examine whether group differ-
ences in subjective change in self-esteem are due to depression, we 
conducted mediation analysis  [19] .
 Maintaining high self-esteem is a fundamental human moti-
vation  [1] . Trauma may lower self-esteem, which in turn contrib-
utes to the development and maintenance of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD)  [2, 3] . Current theories suggest that information 
about the self is processed both deliberatively and impulsively  [4] . 
Implicit Association Tests (IATs)  [5] aim at tapping impulsive 
processes. Although implicit and explicit measures often yield 
similar outcomes, they have been proven to account for different 
aspects of behavior  [6, 7] . Recent research suggests that implicit 
modes of information processing may increase vulnerability to 
PTSD  [8, 9] .
 The present study investigated the deliberate and impulsive 
evaluations of change in self-concept after trauma, that is, the 
subjective change in explicit (ESE) and implicit self-esteem (ISE). 
We considered the subjective change in self-esteem relevant for 
PTSD and used a cross-sectional design. Retrospective ESE and 
ISE prior to trauma relative to present ESE and ISE were examined 
in individuals with current, past, and no PTSD. We predicted that 
current-PTSD individuals evaluate their present self relative to 
their pre-trauma self less positively than past-PTSD individuals 
and no-PTSD individuals. Since PTSD often goes along with de-
pression  [10] , which affects self-esteem  [11] , we investigated the 
interrelation of PTSD, depression, and subjective change in self-
esteem after trauma.
 Fifty-eight participants recruited via advertisements and psy-
chological services (aged 21–63 years, mean = 39.81 years, SD = 
12.23 years; 37 females) reported exposure to an extremely trau-
matic stressor  [12] . Diagnosis of PTSD and co-morbidity were as-
sessed using the SCID for DSM-IV  [13] . Current-PTSD individu-
als (n = 18) had a primary diagnosis of PTSD and a severity score 
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 ANOVAs revealed between-group differences (F 2, 55 = 22.35, 
22.39, and 4.66 for RSES, SD, and IAT, respectively; all p values 
 ̂  0.01). Post-hoc comparisons demonstrated that the subjective 
decrease in ESE in current-PTSD individuals was larger than in 
past-PTSD individuals and no-PTSD individuals ( table  1 ) and 
there was less subjective increase in ISE in current-PTSD indi-
viduals than no-PTSD individuals, but the difference from past-
PTSD individuals failed to reach significance (p = 0.057). Past-
PTSD individuals and no-PTSD individuals did not differ.
 Mediation analyses examined if depression accounted for the 
effect of group on subjective change in self-esteem  [19] . Past-
PTSD and no-PTSD individuals were treated as one no-current 
PTSD group. Regressions revealed that current-PTSD individuals 
had higher levels of depression than no-current-PTSD individu-
als (  = 0.44, p  ̂  0.01). Depression predicted subjective change 
in ESE and ISE (  = –0.35, –0.42, p values  ̂  0.01;   = –0.33, p  ! 
0.06; RSES, SD, IAT, respectively) indicating that higher levels of 
depression went along with less subjective increase in ESE and 
ISE. Sobel tests revealed that controlling for depression reduced 
the influence of group on subjective change in ESE and ISE (sim-
ple regressions,   = –0.67, –0.67, –0.38, all p  ̂  0.01; RSES, SD, 
IAT, respectively; multiple regressions including depression,   = 
–0.42, –0.37, p  ̂  0.01;   = –0.14, p = 0.42; z = –2.47, z = –3.03, 
p  ̂  0.01; z = –1.91, p  ! 0.06; RSES, SD, IAT, respectively). Thus, 
depression partially mediated the effect of group on subjective 
change in ESE and completely accounted for the effect of group 
on subjective change in ISE.
 Results demonstrate that current-PTSD individuals lack a 
subjective increase in ESE and ISE after trauma, different from 
past-PTSD individuals and no-PTSD individuals, indicating that 
subjective change in self-esteem is linked to PTSD rather than to 
the trauma per se. A lack of subjective increase in ESE and ISE 
could account for persistent PTSD hindering individuals from 
recovering.
 Data show that depression fully accounts for subjective change 
in ISE, whereas results on ESE point to a direct effect of PTSD over 
and above depression. This differential contribution of PTSD and 
depression might rely on the fact that ISE refers to affective asso-
ciations of the trauma and the self, e.g. dysphoria  [20] , whereas 
ESE refers to the content of trauma related self-schemas  [21] . Fu-
ture research could use a prospective design and could include a 
depression-only group if the present IAT also proved valid for 
them.
 To conclude, our results are in line with cognitive models sug-
gesting that negative appraisals about the self in the aftermath of 
trauma predict the development and maintenance of PTSD  [2, 3] . 
Our data indicate that ISE refers to impulsively processed percep-
tions of self in PTSD not covered by ESE. We suggest that treat-
ment of PTSD could be improved by including interventions that 
focus on changes in ISE: for instance, guided imagery might be 
extended to images of the self before and after the trauma. Subse-
quent cognitive restructuring and imagery rescripting could fo-
cus on positive aspects that enhance self-esteem and provide sup-
port for continuity of self and personal resources  [22] .
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Table 1.  Summary statistics for separate evaluations of present and prior self, and subjective change in explicit 
self-esteem (Rosenberg scale and semantic differential) and implicit self-esteem (implicit association test)
Current PTSD Past PTSD No PTSD
Rosenberg scale (10–70)
Present self 39.1188.49 57.9588.22 59.9087.48
Prior self 57.9489.27 58.21811.17 58.2989.21
Subjective change –18.83811.53 –0.26810.21 1.6289.35
Semantic differential (3–21)
Present self 11.4483.11 17.0582.46 17.8183.59
Prior self 18.7882.26 17.6383.00 18.1982.66
Subjective change –7.3383.13 –0.5883.41 –0.3884.14
IAT reaction times, ms
Present self + positive 1,504.898736.25 1,151.368276.23 1,005.208202.89
Prior self + positive 1,644.828790.61 1,557.908378.01 1,363.518510.56
Subjective change 0.1780.45 0.4580.28 0.4980.32
D ata are presented as means 8 SD. Subjective change is the difference in the mean scores of present and 
prior self-ratings. Change is based on the ipsatized measure of the IAT effect (see text for details).
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